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Note 
 
First Amendment and the Right to Lie: 
Regulating Knowingly False Campaign Speech 
After United States v. Alvarez 
Staci Lieffring∗
People rely more and more on political advertising to in-
form them about candidates and elections.
 
1 However, political 
advertising has become “dirty” and full of false or misleading 
information.2 People will stop trusting campaign advertising 
and lose respect not only for the candidates, but the entire po-
litical process if the information is found to be false or mislead-
ing.3 If the information voters collect is really false, elections 
will no longer represent the will of the people, which would de-
feat the whole purpose behind the democratic process.4 Thus, 
false campaign speech undermines the integrity of the electoral 
system.5 In order to protect election integrity, some states have 
enacted laws banning false campaign materials.6
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S.B., 
B.A. 2010, University of Minnesota. The author thanks Judge Patrick Dia-
mond for being an instrumental mentor. She would also like to thank the 
hardworking editors and staff members of the Minnesota Law Review. Copy-
right © 2013 by Staci Lieffring.  
 
 1. Evan Richman, Deception in Political Advertising: The Clash Between 
the First Amendment and Defamation Law, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 
667 (1998). 
 2. See Colin B. White, Note, The Straight Talk Express: Yes We Can 
Have a False Political Advertising Statute, 13 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 1–3 (2009) 
(“The American public has grown weary of political advertisements that ma-
nipulate the truth . . . .”); Jack Winsbro, Comment, Misrepresentation in Polit-
ical Advertising: The Role of Legal Sanctions, 36 EMORY L.J. 853, 853–54 
(1987) (tracing the history of misleading political advertising). 
 3. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the "Actual 
Malice" Standard, 82 TUL. L. REV. 889, 889–90 (2008). 
 4. Winsbro, supra note 2, at 863. 
 5. See id. at 863–65. 
 6. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 211B.06, subd. 1 (2010) (“A person is guilty of 
a gross misdemeanor who intentionally participates in the preparation, dis-
semination, or broadcast of paid political advertising or campaign material . . . 
  
1048 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1047 
 
The problem with these statutes, however, is that the First 
Amendment “‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to 
speech uttered during a campaign for political office.”7 Recent-
ly, the Supreme Court gave even more protection to false 
statements. The Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act, which 
made it a crime to lie about receiving a Medal of Honor, finding 
that these false statements are protected by the First Amend-
ment.8
The Supreme Court has said, “Whatever differences may 
exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is 
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental 
affairs.”
 With this backdrop, how to strike an appropriate bal-
ance between the state’s interest in maintaining election integ-
rity on one hand, and a citizen’s right to free speech on the 
other hand, is a problem that the courts and states currently 
struggle to answer.  
9 However, the Supreme Court has also stated, “That 
speech is used as a tool for political ends does not automatically 
bring it under the protective mantle of the Constitution. For 
the use of a known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the 
premises of democratic government . . . .”10 The Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recently found a Minnesota statute criminal-
izing the dissemination of knowingly false speech in promotion 
or defeat of a candidate or ballot initiative to be unconstitu-
tional unless it can pass a strict scrutiny standard.11 The Su-
preme Court, in a similar ruling, struck down a federal law 
making it a crime to make false statements about one’s own 
military service, holding that false, non-defamatory speech was 
protected under the First Amendment.12
 
that is false, and that the person knows is false or communicates to others 
with reckless disregard of whether it is false.”). 
 The question has now 
 7. Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) 
(quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971)). 
 8. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012). 
 9. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
 10. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 11. See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 636 (8th Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470100 (June 29, 2012). 
 12. Compare Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551 (plurality opinion) (declaring that 
any law banning content-based speech must meet strict scrutiny), with id. at 
2556 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that it must survive intermediate scru-
tiny). 
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become: what can a state regulate as false statements under 
the First Amendment?  
This Note addresses the question of how, if at all, “know-
ingly false statements of fact” can be regulated in order to pro-
tect the state’s compelling interest in election integrity without 
infringing upon one’s First Amendment right, in addition to 
looking at other ways to protect election integrity. Part I of this 
Note examines the Supreme Court’s First Amendment juris-
prudence and the current state of election regulation laws. Part 
II analyzes the current challenges to laws attempting to limit 
false speech. It will analyze different statutory schemes against 
court precedent as well as other proposed solutions. Part III 
will pull from Supreme Court precedent, current laws, and oth-
er case law to propose a solution that could be implemented to 
combat false campaign speech while surviving a First Amend-
ment challenge.  
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING FALSE CAMPAIGN 
SPEECH   
Political speech is fundamental in the United States.13
A. LONG HISTORY OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 This 
Part discusses the current Supreme Court precedent regarding 
political speech, the First Amendment, and fraudulent speech. 
It discusses other closely related proscribed speech deemed 
constitutional by the Court. It then discusses current legisla-
tion regarding the ban of false campaign speech across the 
country and how some courts have interpreted the statutes. 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech . . . .”14 The Supreme Court has held that freedom of 
speech does not mean that there is an absolute right to speak 
or publish, with full immunity, whatever one may choose, nor 
does it give people full protection for everything they say.15 The 
First Amendment does not prevent the punishment of those 
who abuse the freedom of speech it protects.16
 
 13. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 867, 898 (2010). 
 Therefore, states 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 15. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 16. Id. 
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may regulate certain speech.17 Generally, any content-based re-
strictions must meet the demands of strict scrutiny,18 meaning 
the restrictions are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling gov-
ernment interest.19
There are exceptions to the general rule providing for strict 
scrutiny review for a few well-defined and narrowly limited 
categories of speech.
 
20 There has not been any constitutional 
problem with the prevention and punishment of these particu-
lar categories of speech.21 These classes of non-protected speech 
include obscenity,22 fighting words,23 child pornography,24 and 
defamation.25 Society has permitted restrictions with a less rig-
orous standard of review provided the restrictions are view-
point neutral26 because those classes are “of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”27 The government’s power to prohibit particular 
speech “on the basis of one content element (e.g., obscenity) 
does not entail the power to proscribe it on the basis of other 
content elements.”28
 
 17. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 776, 777 (1986) (“[T]he 
government cannot limit speech protected by the First Amendment without 
bearing the burden of showing that its restriction is justified.”). 
 While the Constitution protects free 
speech, the Court has recognized exceptions to free speech. 
 18. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 
(2000). 
 19. See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 633 (8th Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470100 (June 29, 2012). 
 20. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); see also Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
 23. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 24. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760–61 (1982). 
 25. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); see also Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347–48 (1974) (narrowing the scope of the 
exception for defamation); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) 
(incorporating an “actual malice” standard for defamation laws).  
 26. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992). 
 27. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 28. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386, 391 (holding that a St. Paul ordinance ban-
ning symbols or displays of “fighting words” that “insult, or provoke violence, 
‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender’” was facially unconstitu-
tional because they could not impose special prohibitions on speakers who ex-
press views on disfavored subjects and not on others). 
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1. Defamation, Sullivan, and the Rise of the Actual Malice 
Standard 
Defamation is one category of speech that the Supreme 
Court has found does not merit First Amendment Protection. In 
the landmark case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Sullivan 
alleged that an advertisement in the New York Times falsely 
implicated him and reflected poorly on him as the Commission-
er of Montgomery, Alabama.29 The Supreme Court held that the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited a government of-
ficial from recovering damages for a defamatory speech related 
to his official conduct unless the statement was made with ac-
tual malice.30 The Court defined actual malice to mean “with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”31
In a subsequent case, the Court further defined the actual 
malice standard. Looking at precedent, the Court did not define 
reckless disregard to mean whether a reasonably prudent per-
son would have published, or would have investigated before 
publishing.
  
32 Instead, the Court held that the evidence must be 
sufficient enough to show that the defendant actually “enter-
tained serious doubts” about the truthfulness of his words.33 
Publishing statements with serious doubts of the truthfulness 
of the statements “shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity 
and demonstrates actual malice.”34
Lastly, the Court in Brown v. Hartlage applied the actual 
malice standard to political speech.
 
35 The Court found that a 
candidate has just as much of a First Amendment right to en-
gage in public debate and advocate for his own election or oth-
ers as any other person.36 A candidate does not give up his or 
her First Amendment rights when he or she runs for public of-
fice.37
 
 29. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256–58. 
 The Court struck down the state law which as-applied 
 30. See id. at 279–80. 
 31. Id.  
 32. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52–53 (1982). 
 36. Id. (applying actual malice standard to statute that prohibited candi-
dates from making certain campaign promises). 
 37. See id. at 53.  
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prohibited speech, because it did not provide sufficient breath-
ing space by not meeting the actual-malice standard.38
2. Other Types of False Speech Are Also Unprotected by the 
First Amendment 
 
The Court has ruled other areas of false speech are unpro-
tected, and thus, has generally upheld laws barring certain 
kinds of false speech. A state fraud law was held constitutional 
because the “[e]xacting proof requirements” provided sufficient 
breathing room for any protected speech.39 Frivolous lawsuits 
can also be punished.40 Tort actions for false, non-defamatory 
statements, such as false light invasion of privacy, where the 
only damage is the offensiveness of the falsehood, not its injury 
to reputation, can also survive, provided the false statements of 
fact were made knowingly or with reckless disregard.41 The 
Court has also found false statements made for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, which are not defamatory, nor an 
invasion of privacy, to be unprotected.42 In addition, under 18 
U.S.C. § 1001, it is a federal crime to knowingly lie to federal 
officers.43 In upholding this statute, the Court reasoned a citi-
zen cannot knowingly and willfully lie to a federal officer and 
not be punished.44 Instead, the citizen has the option to not an-
swer the questions or answer the questions honestly.45 The 
Court has also upheld perjury laws.46
 
 38. See id. at 61 (finding there was “no showing . . . that [Brown] made 
the disputed statement other than in good faith and without knowledge of its 
falsity, or that he made the statement with reckless disregard”). 
 By finding these other ar-
 39. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 
620 (2003) (including requirements that “the defendant made the representa-
tion with the intent to mislead the listener, and succeeded in doing so”). 
 40. See BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002) (upholding 
punishment for frivolous lawsuits that are consistent with “breathing space 
principles” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 41. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390–91 (1967) (finding that 
although the false, non-defamatory statements were not protected by the First 
Amendment in their own right, plaintiffs could not recover unless the false 
statements were made knowingly or with reckless disregard). 
 42. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) (“[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdic-
tion of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the 
United States, knowingly and willfully . . . makes any materially false, ficti-
tious, or fraudulent statement or representation [has committed an offense].”). 
 44. Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969) (upholding criminal 
liability for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961). 
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eas of false speech unprotected by the First Amendment, the 
Court has suggested that there may be no constitutional value 
in protecting false statements of fact or false speech. 
3. False Statements of Fact Have No Constitutional Value 
The Supreme Court has frequently found false statements 
of fact to be particularly valueless. Sharing false information is 
not authorized by the First Amendment47 because the spread-
ing of lies does not serve any legitimate end of the First 
Amendment.48 False statements not only interfere with the 
“truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas,” but also 
cause significant injury to someone’s reputation that is often 
beyond repair even by persuasive rebuttals.49 The Court has 
found that intentional lies or even careless mischaracteriza-
tions work against the societal interest in having “uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open debate” in the public realm.50 However, 
while false statements may be deemed valueless, the Court has 
warned that the Constitution does prevent the state from pro-
hibiting speech merely because that speech is not worthy; the 
First Amendment should prevent any ad hoc balancing of rela-
tive social costs and benefits.51 Regardless of their lack of 
worth, the Court has never held that false statements receive 
no protection from the First Amendment and rejected a cate-
gorical rule that false speech alone is not protected.52
4. Protection of False Speech to Avoid the Chilling of 
Protected Truthful Speech 
 
While the Court has deemed false statements valueless, it 
has also provided that false statements may need to be protect-
ed. In Sullivan, the Court carved out an exception from cate-
gorically unprotected speech in circumstances in which it would 
 
 47. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979). 
 48. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968). 
 49. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).  
 50. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (quoting N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 51. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585–86 (2010) (invalidat-
ing a federal statute criminalizing commercial creation, sale, or possession of 
depictions of animal cruelty because it was overbroad and thus violated the 
First Amendment). 
 52. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (plurality 
opinion). 
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be necessary to avoid chilling true and protected speech.53 The 
Court recognized that incorrect statements are inevitable dur-
ing the course of free debate; therefore, some false speech must 
be protected in order to give speech the “breathing space” it 
needs to survive.54 This again was seen in Brown, as mentioned 
previously, when the Court struck down the statute because it 
did not provide sufficient breathing space by requiring 
knowledge of improper nature.55 The Court has held that in ap-
propriate situations some false statements of fact receive “a 
measure of strategic protection” in order to ensure that regula-
tion of speech does not unduly inhibit fully protected speech.56
5. Political Speech Is One of the Most Protected Forms of 
Speech Under the First Amendment 
 
The breathing space exception to prevent a “chilling effect” 
on protected speech applies to political speech. Political speech 
is at the heart of the protections of the First Amendment.57 In 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court re-
peatedly emphasized how important political speech is while 
striking down bans on political independent expenditures.58 De-
spite this strong protection for political speech, the Court has 
found that a state also has a “compelling interest in preserving 
the integrity of its election process.”59 The Court indicated that 
the state interest in preventing fraud in campaign communica-
tions carries special weight because false statements in election 
materials may have serious adverse consequences on the gen-
eral public.60 Additionally, the Supreme Court found that be-
cause almost every truthful statement about a candidate can be 
considered relevant to his or her capacity to hold office,61
 
 53. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72. 
 the 
 54. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 55. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982). 
 56. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
 57. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). 
 58. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898–99 (2010) (“[P]olitical 
speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or 
inadvertence.”). 
 59. Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989); 
see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 204–06 (1992) (upholding a total 
ban on political speech within 100 feet of a polling place on Election Day). 
 60. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 350–51 (1995) 
(recognizing an interest in preventing fraud, but striking down ban on anony-
mous campaign literature as only indirectly serving the state’s interest). 
 61. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274 (1971) (“The principal 
activity of a candidate in our political system . . . consists in putting before the 
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First Amendment protects the free flow of information about 
candidates running for public office.62 However, simply because 
speech is a tool used in the political sphere does not automati-
cally mean it is protected by the First Amendment because in-
tentionally lying is against the premise of democratic govern-
ment.63
Most restrictions on the freedom of speech must pass a 
strict scrutiny test. There are, however, some categories of un-
protected speech that do not require strict scrutiny review. 
Defamation is one of these categories, but to avoid a chilling ef-
fect on speech, the Court incorporated an actual malice stand-
ard.
 
64
6. United States v. Alvarez: Protected False Speech 
  
The Court’s recent decision in United States v. Alvarez 
suggests that false speech is a protected class if it is non-
defamatory and no harm comes from the lies.65 The defendant 
was charged under the Stolen Valor Act, which made lying 
about receiving the Congressional Medal of Honor a criminal 
act, for lying in a public meeting about serving as a marine and 
receiving a Medal of Honor.66 The plurality refused to recognize 
false speech as a category where content-based regulation is al-
lowed.67 Furthermore, the plurality required a strict scrutiny 
test, which the statute did not pass.68
 
voters every conceivable aspect of his public and private life that he thinks 
may lead the electorate to gain a good impression of him.”). 
 Even though the Court 
found the government’s interest in protecting the integrity of 
the Medal of Honor “beyond question,” the Court failed to find 
that the restriction was actually necessary to promote the in-
 62. See Lance Conn, Comment, Mississippi Mudslinging: The Search for 
the Truth in Political Advertising, 63 MISS. L.J. 507, 513–14 (1994). 
 63. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). 
 64. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) (incorporating 
the actual malice standard in defamation case); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 65. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) (plurality opin-
ion) (finding the Stolen Valor Act overbroad because violations of the law do 
not result in a cognizable harm).  
 66. Id. at 2542. 
 67. Id. at 2543–47. 
 68. Id. at 2547–48 (arguing that if an interest in truthful discourse alone 
was sufficient to support banning speech, without any evidence to show it was 
used to gain a material advantage, the government would have too much cen-
sorship power).  
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terest.69 The Court found that the “remedy for speech that is 
false is speech that is true.”70 While four justices held that 
strict scrutiny should apply, the concurring two justices held 
that intermediate scrutiny should apply.71 However, the plural-
ity strongly suggested that even with political statutes, in 
which a false statement is more likely to make a behavioral dif-
ference, the truth will counteract the lies.72
B. CURRENT LAWS PROHIBITING FALSE CAMPAIGN SPEECH 
 The holding in Al-
varez creates a sizeable hurdle for any law that seeks to regu-
late false speech. 
Although there is no federal law banning false campaign 
speech, there are currently seventeen states with statutes pro-
hibiting such speech.73 The definition of campaign speech and 
prohibited speech varies among states. Some statutes prohibit 
any false statement with regard to a candidate.74 Some prohibi-
tions are limited to specific kinds of false statements, such as 
statements relating to a candidate’s honesty, integrity or moral 
character,75 those appearing in political advertisements or 
campaign literature,76 or even those statements made as part of 
a telephone poll.77
 
 69. Id. at 2549 (finding no link between the government’s interest and the 
Act’s restrictions; no evidence that public perception was diluted, and no rea-
son that counterspeech would not serve to achieve the government’s interest). 
 Florida limits the liability solely to false 
 70. Id. at 2550 (“Society has the right and civic duty to engage in open, 
dynamic, rational discourse. These ends are not well served when the govern-
ment seeks to orchestrate public discussion through content-based man-
dates.”). 
 71. Id. at 2552. 
 72. Id. at 2556. 
 73. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.095 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109 
(2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.271 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463 
(2012); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 56, § 42 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 211B.06 (2010); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(a)(7)-(8) 
(2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 3517.21, 3517.22 (LexisNexis 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.532 (2009); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-13-16 (2004 & Supp. 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-
142 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-11-1103 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 42.17A.335 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-11 (LexisNexis 2011); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 12.05 (West 2004). 
 74. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463; 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 56, § 42; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21; UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 20A-11-1103; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-11(c); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 12.05. 
 75. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875. 
 76. MINN. STAT. § 211B.06; N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04; OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 260.532(1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-142. 
 77. ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.095. 
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statements made by a candidate about an opposing candidate.78 
Some states punish only knowingly false statements,79 while 
other states also prohibit statements made in reckless disre-
gard of the truth.80 Some statutes also include prohibitions on 
false speech about ballot initiatives.81 Oregon requires that the 
false statement be related to a material fact.82 In addition to 
laws banning false campaign speech, states also have laws 
banning deceptive practices.83 States also have laws banning 
political material of campaigning in the polling place on Elec-
tion Day.84 Both Washington’s and Minnesota’s laws banning 
false political speech have been challenged and found to be un-
constitutional by different courts.85
 
 78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.271. 
 A review of these decisions 
will provide insight into what courts have considered while 
evaluating restrictions on false political speech. 
 79. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 56, § 42; MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875; S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 12-13-16 (2004 & Supp. 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-142; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-11-1103; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-11(c); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 12.05. 
 80. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.095(a); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109(2)(a) 
(2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 211B.06; N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 163-274(a)(7)-(8) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04; OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21 (LexisNexis 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.532. 
 81. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 56, § 42; MINN. 
STAT. § 211B.06; N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3517.22; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.532; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-13-16; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-11-1103; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 12.05. 
 82. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.532(1). 
 83. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-1005.1(A) (2011) (criminalizing know-
ingly communicating false election information to a registered voter about the 
time, date, or place of voting and false information regarding a voter's polling 
site or registration status); see also 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29–4 (West 
2010) (“Any person who, by . . . deception . . . knowingly prevents [another 
from voting or registering to vote has committed an offense].”); MINN. STAT. 
§ 204C.035 (2010) (outlawing a person from knowingly deceiving another per-
son about election information). 
 84. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 211B.11, subd. 1 (2010) (outlawing the display 
of campaign materials or otherwise attempting to persuade voters, including a 
ban on political buttons or other insignia, in polling places). 
 85. See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 635 (8th Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470100 (June 29, 2012); Rickert v. State, Pub. Disclo-
sure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 827 (Wash. 2007); Washington ex rel. Pub. Disclo-
sure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 693 (Wash. 1998). 
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1. Washington State’s Law Was Found Unconstitutional by 
Washington State Supreme Court 
Washington’s current statute regarding false campaign 
speech requires defamation or libel and actual malice.86 Wash-
ington’s statute has been struck down twice by the Washington 
Supreme Court as being unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.87 In Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure Commis-
sion v. 119 Vote No! Committee, the Washington Supreme 
Court struck down the Washington statute that prohibited “any 
person from sponsoring, with actual malice, a political adver-
tisement containing a false statement of material fact.”88 The 
court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it 
failed to meet the exacting strict scrutiny test.89 The court 
found “the State’s claimed compelling interest to shield the 
public from falsehoods during a political campaign [was] pa-
tronizing and paternalistic.”90 Washington then amended their 
law to “proscribe sponsoring, with actual malice, a political ad-
vertisement containing a false statement of material fact about 
a candidate for public office.”91 The court later held that this 
amendment failed to remedy the statute’s unconstitutionality.92 
The court again found that the Washington statute extended to 
protected speech and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny.93
 
 86. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17A.335 (2012) (“(1) It is a viola-
tion . . . for a person to sponsor with actual malice a statement constituting 
libel or defamation per se under the following circumstances: (a) Political ad-
vertising or an electioneering communication that contains a false statement 
of material fact about a candidate for public office.”). 
  
 87. Rickert, 168 P.3d at 827; 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 693. 
 88. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 693 (charging a political action 
committee with violating the Washington statute). 
 89. Id. at 699 (“We therefore conclude [the statute] chills political speech, 
usurps the rights of the electorate to determine the merits of political initia-
tives without fear of government sanction, and lacks a compelling state inter-
est in justification.”). 
 90. Id. at 698. 
 91. Rickert, 168 P.3d at 827 (discussing the amended language). 
 92. Id. (finding the statute unconstitutional while recognizing that other 
states had enacted and upheld similar statutes). 
 93. See id. at 828–29 (holding that under the Sullivan standard, only de-
famatory statements were unprotected by the First Amendment, whereas the 
Washington statute did not purport to be limited to the narrow category of de-
famatory statements). 
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2. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Strikes down Minnesota’s 
Ban on False Campaign Speech 
More recently, in 281 Care Committee v. Arneson, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down Minnesota’s ban 
on false campaign speech as unconstitutional unless it can 
meet the demands of strict scrutiny.94 Minnesota’s statute 
made it a gross misdemeanor to “intentionally participate[] in 
the preparation, dissemination, or broadcast of paid political 
advertising or campaign material . . . that is false, and that the 
person knows is false or communicates to others with reckless 
disregard of whether it is false.”95 This statute proscribes only 
false statements of fact that are made with knowledge of their 
falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they are false,96 
which incorporates the actual malice standard set by the Su-
preme Court in Sullivan.97 A group of grass-roots political asso-
ciations sued the Minnesota Attorney General and the relevant 
county attorneys alleging that their rights to free speech were 
violated by the current Minnesota statute.98
Regardless of the “actual malice” standard incorporated in 
the statute, 281 Care Committee held that the campaign speech 
proscribed by the Minnesota statute was fully protected by the 
First Amendment.
 
99 The court found that because the speech in 
question was political in nature, it was “at the heart of the pro-
tections of the First Amendment,”100 which raised special con-
stitutional concerns.101
 
 94. See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 636 (8th Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470100 (June 29, 2012) (remanding to the district court 
for strict scrutiny analysis because the district court originally determined 
that the speech at issue fell outside the protections of the First Amendment, 
thus concluding that a strict scrutiny analysis was unnecessary). 
 A state may only regulate false cam-
 95. MINN. STAT. § 211B.06, subd. 1 (2010). The statute was amended after 
a state court decision in which the Minnesota Court of Appeals struck down 
the previous version of the statute for not meeting the actual malice standard 
in Sullivan. See State v. Jude, 554 N.W.2d 750, 753–54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) 
(holding that the phrase “knows or has reason to believe is false” was over-
broad and did not meet the actual malice standard from N.Y. Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)). 
 96. MINN. STAT. § 211B.06, subd. 1. 
 97. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
 98. See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 625 (alleging plaintiff’s speech was 
chilled due to the threat of possible prosecution). 
 99. See id. at 635 (finding that Supreme Court precedent does not recog-
nize knowingly false speech as a category outside the protection of the First 
Amendment). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 636. 
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paign speech “when it satisfies the First Amendment test re-
quired for content-based speech restrictions: that any regula-
tion be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government in-
terest.”102
3. Minnesota’s Ban on Soliciting near Polling Places 
 This case tends to suggest that even if the “actual 
malice” standard is applied, courts could still be leery of enforc-
ing prohibitions on false campaign speech unless they meet the 
demand of strict scrutiny. 
The District Court in Minnesota upheld Minnesota’s stat-
ute prohibiting people from displaying campaign material, in-
cluding posting signs or asking voters to vote a particular way 
within 100 feet of a polling place as constitutional.103 The court 
found that the Supreme Court had found a similar law restrict-
ing display of campaign posters or signs within 100 feet of a 
polling place passed strict scrutiny as a “facially content-based 
restriction on political speech in a public forum.”104 The court 
upheld the constitutionality of an as-applied challenged to but-
tons containing the phrase “Please I.D. Me,” as a politically 
charged issue, in addition to the potential to cause voter confu-
sion and deception.105
The Supreme Court has suggested it would allow some 
prohibitions on free speech by finding there is sufficient 
“breathing space” for speech that is protected. “Breathing 
space” has generally been interpreted to mean an “actual mal-
ice” standard.
  
106
 
 102. Id. (“[G]iven our historical skepticism of permitting the government to 
police the line between truth and falsity, and between valuable speech and 
drivel, we presumptively protect all speech, including false statements, in or-
der that clearly protected speech may flower in the shelter of the First 
Amendment.” (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1217 (9th Cir. 
2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012))).  
 There are many different variations of state 
prohibitions on free speech, some of which have recently been 
challenged. In addition, the Court has approved laws aimed at 
decreasing or eliminating voter deception. Part II of this Note 
will analyze different approaches of banning false political 
speech against what the Court suggested will not withstand a 
 103. Minn. Majority v. Mansky, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1133 (D. Minn. 
2011). 
 104. Id. at 1121 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992)). 
 105. Id. at 1123. 
 106. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968); N.Y. Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
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constitutional challenge under strict scrutiny and the “breath-
ing space” standard set forth by the Court in defamation cases. 
II.  COMPARISON OF STATUTORY SCHEMES WITH 
COURT PRECEDENT   
Part II of this Note analyzes the public harm as a compel-
ling state interest, as well as other attempts to decrease false 
campaign speech. This Part considers different methods and 
viewpoints of addressing the problem of false political speech 
and analyzes the various schemes in light of existing precedent. 
In order for false political speech to be most effectively stopped, 
the Supreme Court would have to fundamentally change its po-
sition to include false, non-defamatory speech as a category un-
protected by the First Amendment. Despite this obstacle, this 
section will discuss some proposed remedies or other solutions 
that may help to counteract false and deceptive campaign 
speech. 
A. WHAT THE COURT PRECEDENT SUGGESTS AS APPROPRIATE 
RESTRICTIONS ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
The Supreme Court has allowed some prohibitions on free 
speech by incorporating the actual malice standard to provide 
breathing space for protected speech. There is a strong pre-
sumption of First Amendment political speech being protected; 
therefore, any law that proscribes political speech would most 
likely have to meet a strict scrutiny standard.107 281 Care 
Committee found that the state may regulate false political 
speech only when the regulation is narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling government interest;108 it did not hold whether or 
not the statute passed strict scrutiny.109
 
 107. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2538 (2012) (plurality 
opinion) (holding that the Stolen Valor Act did not survive strict scrutiny, alt-
hough the concurring justices applied intermediate scrutiny to strike down the 
Act); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
 After the decision in 
Alvarez, any statute directly regulating false speech would 
have to pass strict scrutiny. It seems likely that the Court 
would strike down any attempt to regulate false, non-
defamatory campaign speech. This Part of the Note considers if 
 108. 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 636 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 2012 WL 2470100 (June 29, 2012). 
 109. Id. (remanding the case back to the district court for findings on 
whether the statute passed strict scrutiny). 
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any statutory language would pass strict scrutiny, or if regulat-
ing false campaign speech would ever be possible. 
1. Strict Scrutiny Analysis 
In order to pass the strict scrutiny test, a statute needs to 
incorporate an actual malice standard if it proscribes false po-
litical speech.110 The actual malice standard has been found to 
provide sufficient breathing space to not chill political speech in 
a defamatory action.111 In addition to being narrowly tailored, 
any statute would need to be motivated by a compelling gov-
ernment interest. The state has a compelling interest in prohib-
iting false campaign speech. The fact that the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly recognized the state’s strong interest in “pre-
serving the integrity of its election process”112 supports this 
proposition. False speech is harmful to public debate because it 
causes people to lose interest and leave the debate and voting 
arena and also has the capability of skewing the election out-
come.113 In order to help bolster this compelling interest, a law-
making body could add legislative findings showing the harm to 
the integrity of the election process caused by false campaign 
speech. The government can also show that false speech con-
fuses voters and causes “undue influence” on voters.114 While 
the Washington State Supreme Court found this articulated 
state interest to be “patronizing and paternalistic” to voters,115 
the Supreme Court has indicated its support of this state inter-
est.116 The state’s interest should be in protecting the election 
process itself, not just in protecting candidates’ private inter-
ests, such as their reputation or privacy.117
 
 110. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
 To pass a strict 
 111. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
 112. Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989). 
 113. See Becky Kruse, Comment, The Truth Masquerade: Regulating False 
Ballot Proposition Ads Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 CALIF. L. 
REV. 129, 160–62 (2001). 
 114. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (finding that states 
have “a compelling interest in protecting voters from confusion and undue in-
fluence”); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983) (finding the 
Court has “upheld generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that pro-
tect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself”). 
 115. Washington ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 
957 P.2d 691, 698 (Wash. 1998). 
 116. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 199; Eu, 489 U.S. at 231; Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 
at 788. 
 117. See Kruse, supra note 113, at 159 (arguing that ballot initiatives 
should also be protected from false speech because the state interest is in the 
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scrutiny test, a statute would need to be both narrowly tailored 
and aimed at a compelling state interest. The following Section 
of this Note discusses how these and other court precedent 
plays into the constitutionality of a statute. 
2. State Statutory Language: Common Themes and Analysis 
Under Court Precedent 
Following Court precedent, a statute regulating false 
speech would mostly likely be found unconstitutional; however, 
if a statute were found constitutional it would at least need to 
include four elements: falsity, statement of fact, which causes a 
cognizable harm, and actual malice.118 Most of the current state 
statutes would be considered overbroad.119 Even though most of 
the current state statutes limit speech because the speech is 
false, the statutes are overbroad by not encompassing all re-
quirements and are therefore likely to be unconstitutional.120 
The Court has suggested that false speech should be remedied 
by more speech.121
Some states have a stricter standard of knowledge and on-
ly punish knowingly false statements.
 
122
 
electoral process and the need for a well—and accurately—informed elec-
torate); see also Developments in the Law—Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 
1278–79 (1975) (arguing that the prohibition of false statements is directed 
towards the protection of processes to select political leaders, and not the indi-
vidual’s reputation). 
 A statute that only 
punishes knowingly false statements is narrower than one that 
includes an actual malice standard. One would have to prove 
actual knowledge, not just reckless disregard; therefore, it 
would be harder to prosecute or bring an effective claim against 
someone. A statute only punishing knowingly false statements 
would not be as effective, nor would it apply to as much false 
speech as a statute that incorporated the actual malice stand-
 118. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2556 (2012) (Breyer, J., 
concurring); Kruse, supra note 113, at 163. 
 119. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (stating that a stat-
ute is overbroad when it “does not aim specifically at evils within the allowa-
ble area of state control but . . . sweeps within its ambit other activities that 
. . . constitute an exercise [of protected speech]”). 
 120. See Kruse, supra note 113, at 163–65 (arguing that state statutes do 
not limit speech because of its content, but rather because of “the public evils 
of false political speech,” which the state has a compelling interest in limiting). 
 121. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2550 (plurality opinion). 
 122. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 56, § 42 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875 
(2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-13-16 (2004 & Supp. 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 2-19-142 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-11-1103 (2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 3-8-11(c) (LexisNexis 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 12.05 (West 2004). 
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ard because it would require proving actual knowledge versus 
reckless disregard. Sullivan calls for an actual malice stand-
ard.123 The state statutes which punish knowingly false speech 
and speech made with reckless disregard of the truth,124
B. FALSE CAMPAIGN SPEECH PRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL HARM 
 while 
meeting the actual malice standard, would be seen as too broad 
on other grounds.  
There are many problems associated with false campaign 
speech. It can reduce the integrity of the entire electoral pro-
cess by misleading and manipulating voters by “distort[ing] the 
issues, distract[ing] the voters from making informed decisions, 
inhibit[ing] voter turnout, and alienat[ing] the citizenry.”125 
Democracy is based upon an informed electorate.126 However, in 
a recent study more than nine in ten voters said they encoun-
tered at least some misleading campaign information, with 
more than half of the participants stating that they saw mis-
leading information frequently.127 Researchers also found that 
voters were substantially misinformed on many important is-
sues in the election.128 In fact, it can mislead voters into actual-
ly voting against their interests, which completely removes the 
legitimacy and representativeness of direct democracy.129 
Therefore, to the extent that false political ads confuse or mis-
lead voters, those false ads obstruct the entire process that de-
mocracy is based upon.130
 
 123. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
  
 124. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.095(a) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109 
(2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.271 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463 
(2012); MINN. STAT. § 211B.06 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(a)(7)-(8) 
(2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21 
(LexisNexis 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.532 (2009). 
 125. William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amend-
ment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 285 (2004) (arguing that the effects of false cam-
paign speech “can be as corrosive as the worst campaign finance abuses”). 
 126. Marcia Clemmitt, Lies and Politics: Do Politicians Lie More Today?, 
21 CQ RESEARCHER 147, 148 (Feb. 18, 2011). 
 127. Id. at 148. 
 128. CLAY RAMSAY ET AL., MISINFORMATION AND THE 2010 ELECTION: A 
STUDY OF THE US ELECTORATE 4 (Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www 
.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/dec10/Misinformation_Dec10_rpt.pdf. 
 129. Kruse, supra note 113, at 150 (arguing further that the state has an 
interest in preventing fraud because of the serious, adverse consequences to 
the public from false statements in political advertising causes). 
 130. Clemmitt, supra note 126, at 148; see also Louis A. Day, Political Ad-
vertising and the First Amendment, in POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 39, 41 
(Robert Mann & David Perlmutter eds., 2011) [hereinafter Day, Political Ad-
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Not only do lies in campaign speech mislead voters, lies al-
so lower the quality of debate, which in turn leaves many vot-
ers distrustful.131 Attack ads containing false statements lower 
the quality of debate by creating an incentive for response ads, 
thereby decreasing the time spent on substantive issues.132 The 
potential for untruths and misrepresentations can also have 
the effect of discouraging a highly qualified candidate from 
running for any elected office.133 This potential for untruths and 
misleading information is magnified by the ability of today’s 
media to exaggerate negative campaign ads and cause even 
more concern for the integrity of the election process.134
Although false speech about candidates is harmful to the 
integrity of elections, deceptive campaign practices also pose a 
significant risk.
 Overall, 
falsities in political campaigns create significant harms for the 
electoral process. This harm clearly shows a compelling state 
interest in protecting the general public from lies in campaign 
and political materials.  
135 Deceptive campaigns are designed to misdi-
rect certain voters about the voting process or affect their incli-
nation to vote.136 Frequently used tactics include false state-
ments about polling places, date of election, or eligibility of 
voters.137
 
vertising] (stating false statements can distort the electoral process); Jonathan 
D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and 
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1108 (2006) (“At first 
glance, restraining deceptive communication furthers rather than disrupts en-
lightenment of the populace—by promoting truth.”). 
 The state certainly has a compelling interest in mak-
ing sure that all information regarding time, place and voter 
 131. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 895–96 (citing a USA TODAY/Gallup 
Poll, “where seven out of ten persons said they believed ‘not much’ or ‘nothing 
at all’ of what they heard in political ads” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
see also Marshall, supra note 125, at 295–96 (arguing that low voter turnout 
has collateral harms such as negating the democratic process). 
 132. See Day, Political Advertising, supra note 130. 
 133. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 896–97 (stating that campaigns are the 
hardest on the candidates); see also Marshall, supra note 125, at 296 (arguing 
that false statements can “inflict reputational and emotional injury” and that 
damaging the reputation of political leaders leads to harm of the community 
as well).  
 134. See Terri R. Day, “Nasty as They Wanna Be” Politics: Clean Cam-
paigning and the First Amendment, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 647, 649 (2009) 
[hereinafter Day, Clean Campaigning]. 
 135. See Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343, 350 (2010).  
 136. Id. at 353–54. 
 137. ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, E-Deceptive Campaign 
Practices Report 2010: Internet Technology & Democracy 2.0, 8 (Oct. 2010), 
http://epic.org/privacy/voting/E_Deceptive_Report_10_2010.pdf.  
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eligibility are correct. The Court, in the context of preventing 
voter fraud, has recognized that “public confidence in the integ-
rity of the electoral process has independent significance, be-
cause it encourages citizen participation in the democratic pro-
cess.”138
C. FALSE CAMPAIGN SPEECH: ATTEMPTS TO BALANCE FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS WITH ELECTION INTEGRITY  
 Even though the government has a compelling interest, 
the Court is not likely to find that a statute banning false polit-
ical speech is narrowly tailored. 
There has been some debate over different solutions to the 
problem of false, negative advertising, and its adverse effect on 
the public. Some scholars would completely abolish any prohi-
bitions on political speech and leave the consequences of false 
speech to candidates. Others would suggest taking non-legal 
remedies, such as creating truth taskforces, voluntary ethics 
codes, and other similar actions. Even among advocates of legal 
remedies there is disagreement. Some believe that a lesser 
standard than actual malice should apply, while others disa-
gree regarding remedies or effectiveness.139
1. Critics Argue There Should Be No Restrictions on Political 
Speech 
 This Section ex-
pands and analyzes these different approaches to solving this 
problem.  
Free speech, especially political speech, is one of the most 
protected rights in America.140 Therefore, many scholars argue 
that the government cannot and should not regulate political 
speech at all.141
 
 138. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197 (2008) (up-
holding voter identification laws because the state has strong interest in pre-
venting voter fraud). 
 They point to language of the Supreme Court 
that seems to suggest that the proper remedy for false or mis-
 139. Compare White, supra note 2, at 50–52 (suggesting the use of actual 
malice), with Goldman, supra note 3, at 906 (advocating a lesser standard 
than actual malice). 
 140. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) 
(stating the First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent application pre-
cisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office” (citations omitted)). 
 141. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A 
Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 238 (1992) (“In political campaigns 
the grossest misstatements, deceptions, and defamations are immune from 
legal sanction unless they violate private rights . . . .”). 
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leading speech is more speech, not less speech.142 The Court has 
also found that the “test of the truth” is simply the power of a 
thought to be accepted in the marketplace of ideas.143 A political 
candidate has a large incentive to expose false statements.144 
Opponents of regulating false speech also argue that a state’s 
interest in regulating election integrity is not met by punishing 
false statements of speech; the process of finding the speech 
false is likely to take much longer than the election cycle, so it 
will do nothing to make sure voters are not misinformed.145 
Furthermore, opponents argue that negative advertising has 
little effect on voters.146
Doing nothing to curb false political speech is not an effec-
tive remedy. Candidates may not always respond to false or 
misleading assertions by their opponents.
 While doing nothing is an option that 
would certainly provide no First Amendment issues, it would 
not address the issue of rampant campaign fraud and decep-
tion. 
147 Even if candidates 
did respond to every negative charge, they are then forced to 
focus their resources on responding, thus taking away from the 
time and money spent discussing real substantive issues.148 
Without an effective legal remedy there is no deterrence and 
false and misleading advertising will continue to increase.149
 
 142. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) (plurality 
opinion); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 
While candidates may have an incentive to respond to false as-
sertions made against them, states have a significant interest 
 143. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990). But see 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974) (“[T]ruth rarely 
catches up with a lie.”). 
 144. See Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 61 (“In a political campaign, a candidate’s 
factual blunder is unlikely to escape the notice of, and correction by, the erring 
candidate’s political opponent.”). 
 145. See Marshall, supra note 125, at 297 (putting forth arguments against 
regulating campaign speech, but rebutting these arguments by advocating 
remedies, such as invalidating election results or having a judicial decree of 
falsity). 
 146. See Day, Clean Campaigning, supra note 134, at 654. 
 147. See Winsbro, supra note 2, at 890–91 (discussing how candidates are 
arguably better off if they do not respond to attacks from opponents). There 
are generally three ways to respond to false or negative ads: by releasing one’s 
own false or carefully crafted charges against opponents, ignoring attacks 
completely, or merely asserting with no elaboration that the charges are false. 
Id. 
 148. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 895 (“False advertising, usually nega-
tive, lowers the quality of political discourse and debate.”). 
 149. See id. at 907.  
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in decreasing the incentive for false statements to be made at 
all. Even if the Court strikes down any statute banning false, 
non-defamatory speech, the option to sue for defamatory speech 
should be open and a possible avenue to dissuade false cam-
paign speech. 
2. Non-Legal Options for Prohibiting False Campaign Speech 
Other ideas would be to change the political advertising 
industry instead of trying to create laws that may interfere 
with First Amendment rights.150 There have been some calls for 
local media outlets to fact-check political advertisements.151 In 
past elections, a major advertising agency has even donated 
advertising so candidates can actually discuss issues instead of 
engaging in smear campaigns.152 Another suggestion is for net-
works to place restraints on televised ads, or to award candi-
dates free air time on the condition they consent to an “issue-
oriented” format for all television ads.153 While these ideas may 
have some merit, some of the ideas would only apply or be fea-
sible for large races, such as a presidential campaign. There are 
thousands of small, local elections and ballot issues that only 
affect a small portion of any television-viewing audience. It 
would not be possible or practical to allow all local candidates 
free air time. In addition, although these ideas could be effec-
tive at pointing out false claims to viewers, the suggestions 
may not be effective in changing any voters’ decision.154
 
 150. See, e.g., Martha M. Hamilton, Cleaning Up the Mudslinging; Ad Ex-
ecutive Proposes Self-Regulating Body to Police Political Commercials, WASH. 
POST, July 30, 1996, at C1 (quoting a former chairman of the American Asso-
ciation of Advertising Agencies who called for a self-regulating organization to 
test political ads for truthfulness and fairness). 
 Plus, 
some of the suggestions, such as donating advertisement or free 
issue-oriented television air time, have no real deterrence fac-
tor, nor do they create a punishment. The best these sugges-
tions can hope to do is create an incentive to play clean. 
 151. See id. For an example of a “factcheck,” see POLITIFACT.COM, 
http://www.politifact.com/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2012) (including a “truth-o-
meter” to indicate if facts are true or “pants on fire” lies). 
 152. See Hamilton, supra note 150. 
 153. See Timothy J. Moran, Format Restrictions on Televised Political Ad-
vertising: Elevating Political Debate Without Suppressing Free Speech, 67 IND. 
L.J. 663, 663 (1992) (advocating for a policy which awards free advertising ra-
ther than content restrictions that may violate the First Amendment). 
 154. See Richman, supra note 1, at 685 n.95 (citing a study regarding ad 
watches and the ineffectiveness of changing the intentions of the voter). 
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Other suggestions have included self-appointed bodies or 
having candidates pledging to uphold a code of campaign eth-
ics.155 But, self-regulating bodies lack any authority over candi-
dates and are thus powerless to do anything even if the body 
made a finding that a candidate violated the self-regulating 
body’s standard of ethics.156 By the same token, voluntary codes 
have been found to be ineffective as well because there is noth-
ing to bind a candidate to obeying the code even if the candi-
dates can agree to the code in the first place.157
3. There Needs to Be a Legal Remedy for False Statements of 
Political Speech 
 These are not 
effective in protecting the state’s interest in election integrity, 
and therefore, should not be considered narrower, effective al-
ternatives in a strict scrutiny test. 
There needs to be a legal remedy or consequence for false 
campaign advertising, as a legal remedy is the only way to ef-
fectively and realistically decrease false statements and the 
statement’s impacts on potential voters. Leaving candidates, 
interest groups, and other interested parties free to spread lies 
regarding their opposition poses a significant harm to the pub-
lic. At the very least, laws banning deceptive tactics aimed at 
decreasing voter turnout should be in place. Not only does false 
or deceptive speech mislead voters, it has the potential to cre-
ate outcomes not supported by the public.158 In addition, self-
regulating bodies, candidate pacts, and other similar remedies 
have already been shown to be ineffective.159
 
 155. See id. at 684–85 (discussing the impracticality of these suggestions). 
 Those non-legal 
remedies are only focused on candidates, and do nothing to 
curb outrageous lies by independent expenditures, interest 
groups, or individuals not affiliated with a particular candi-
date.  
 156. See id. at 685 (offering the Citizens for Fair Campaign Practices 
Committee as an example, which found that a candidate had an ad with “inac-
curacies, distortions, and misrepresentations” at an open hearing, but lacked 
ability to punish the candidate). 
 157. See id.; see also Day, Clean Campaigning, supra note 134, at 654–55 
(defining a voluntary pledge as a non-enforceable promise by a candidate and 
discussing the lack of enforceability). 
 158. See Kruse, supra note 113, at 150. 
 159. See, e.g., Day, Clean Campaigning, supra note 134, at 655–58 (discuss-
ing the failures of attempts to judicially enforce “clean campaign” codes and 
promises). 
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D. ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE FALSE CAMPAIGN SPEECH 
PROHIBITIONS 
There have been several proposed changes to address the 
problem of false campaign speech, ranging from new causes of 
action to stricter knowledge standards or alternative remedies. 
This Section of the Note addresses the different proposed 
changes. It analyzes the effects of the solutions and discusses 
what would fail a strict scrutiny test. 
One proposed solution would be for the courts to recognize 
a cause of action for campaign slander.160 The solution would 
entail asking the court to make a factual finding and enter it 
into the public record that the information was inaccurate.161 A 
cause of action for campaign slander would not include a find-
ing of actual malice, just that the facts were incorrect, unless 
the opponent repeated the same false statements after the ini-
tial finding.162 This would serve to give the candidate an “offi-
cial vindication” that could be used to both attack her oppo-
nent’s credibility, as well as rehabilitate her own reputation.163 
While a candidate may be very concerned for his or her image 
and be willing to spend money to combat false statements,164
 
 160. Thomas Kane, Note, Malice, Lies, and Videotape: Revisiting New York 
Times v. Sullivan in the Modern Age of Political Campaigns, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 
755, 791–93 (1999). 
 
this solution raises some concerns. First, this adjudication 
would need to happen very quickly; campaigns are relatively 
short, and false campaign speech could happen all the way up 
until Election Day. There would be very little incentive for 
someone to bring a challenge to false statements made within a 
week of the election, because there would be insufficient time to 
 161. See id. at 791. 
 162. See id. at 792–93 (proposing a cause of action that would create a “re-
buttable presumption” that a party would be imputed with knowledge of falsi-
ty, and thus actual malice, if it repeated the challenged claim following an ini-
tial adjudication of falsehood; this would deter repetition in order to avoid 
paying large damages under a traditional defamation analysis). 
 163. See id. at 791–92 (arguing that vindication by a “neutral and detached 
judicial arbiter” is far more powerful than any current remedy and much more 
effective than responding directly or waiting for someone else to respond). 
 164. See id. at 794 (suggesting that the current strategy of “fighting fire 
with fire” indicates this cause of action would be utilized even without the 
availability of damages because candidates are already spending lots of money 
to rehabilitate their image in the media without being awarded damages; 
therefore, they would be likely to utilize this cause of action even though it 
would cost money to litigate and no damages would be awarded). 
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get a ruling and rehabilitate their campaign.165 Even if effec-
tive, a cause of action for campaign slander would almost cer-
tainly not pass constitutional muster, as there is no “breathing 
space” to prevent a chilling effect on protected First Amend-
ment speech.166
One observer proposed the following statute specifically 
aimed at preventing false speech on ballot issues: “No person 
shall, with actual malice and intent to impede the success of a 
campaign for the passage or defeat of a ballot proposition, 
cause to be published a false statement of material fact con-
cerning that ballot proposition.”
  
167 This proposed language, 
while focused on ballot initiatives, does include some important 
elements. Even though the actual malice requirement, along 
with a material fact requirement, narrows the statute, this still 
is not narrow enough to survive strict scrutiny. It does provide 
additional breathing space by including a “published” require-
ment.168
1. Actual Malice Standard and the Problems with Only a 
Negligence Standard 
 This statute also fails to specify a remedy. Because it is 
only aimed at ballot provisions, it would not pass a strict scru-
tiny test. There is no “cognizable” harm, nor can any of the 
statements be seen as defamatory, because it addresses ballot 
initiatives, not candidates. 
There are several different viewpoints on the effectiveness 
and necessity of an actual malice standard. One suggestion is 
that statutes prohibiting false campaign speech should be 
changed to conform to the actual malice standard in Sullivan.169
 
 165. See Developments in the Law, supra note 
 
117, at 1285 (stating that 
there may not be enough time for corrective remedies to work or for a candi-
date to respond to false statements made in the final days or hours of the 
campaign). 
 166. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (finding 
that “erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate,” so there needs to be 
“breathing space” in the doctrine by requiring actual malice); see also Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (holding that in appropriate situa-
tions some false statements of fact receive “a measure of strategic protection,” 
in order to ensure that regulation of speech does not unduly inhibit fully pro-
tected speech). 
 167. See Kruse, supra note 113, at 170. 
 168. Cf. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72 (finding breathing space is required 
because inaccurate statements are unavoidable in free debate).  
 169. See, e.g., Conn, supra note 62, at 517 (“The Mississippi campaign falsi-
ty statute should . . . wholly conform to the standards set forth in New York 
Times.”). 
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This arguably would clear up uncertainties about what political 
false speech entails.170 Similarly, another scholarly proposal ar-
gues for the actual malice standard to remain and be incorpo-
rated into a federal statute.171 While there are criticisms about 
the actual malice standard and the lack of effectiveness, Sulli-
van seems to suggest that something akin to the actual malice 
standard is necessary to provide breathing space.172
Other scholars advocate for a lesser standard of negligence, 
arguing that the actual malice standard is too hard to meet and 
provides false campaign advertising with too much protec-
tion.
  
173 Instead, it has been argued that plain defamation cases 
are not the appropriate analogy for false campaign speech to 
follow.174 One proposal suggests that the government should be 
responsible for bringing claims of false campaign speech under 
a federal statute and proving “by clear and convincing evidence 
that the challenged statement was false, material, and negli-
gently made.”175 To pass strict scrutiny, there would be limits 
placed on the proposed statute’s coverage based on the “propo-
nent, the medium, and the time frame of the communication.”176
This proposal still would not pass strict scrutiny. By only 
incorporating a negligence standard, it would have the effect of 
chilling protected speech.
  
177
 
 170. See id.  
 A pure negligence standard would 
not meet the requirements of protecting the First Amendment 
right to free speech. It would be much easier for candidates to 
prove a mere negligence standard, thus having a much greater 
chilling effect on speech by candidates or others that may wish 
to speak but are worried about their statements being chal-
lenged. Even the threat of having to face a lawsuit could have 
the effect of quieting speech, because a negligence standard is 
much lower, and would entice many more candidates to bring 
claims. 
 171. See White, supra note 2, at 50–52 (arguing that the actual malice 
standard provides a meaningful remedy). 
 172. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271, 280. 
 173. Goldman, supra note 3, at 905–06 (arguing that in today’s world of 
tabloids and Internet sources, a defendant would likely have some basis to as-
sert she “thought” it was true). 
 174. Id. at 909–14 (putting forth arguments that the First Amendment 
right is weaker and the state’s interest is stronger in false political campaign 
contexts than regular defamation contexts). 
 175. Id. at 915. 
 176. Id. at 921. 
 177. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731–32 (1968); Sullivan, 
376 U.S. at 279–80. 
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2. Material and Objective False Statements of Fact Which 
Cause Cognizable Harm 
Narrowing the prohibited speech to statements that are 
“material or have a recognizable effect on a candidate’s elec-
toral prospects”178 may help a statute pass the strict scrutiny 
test. Minor misstatements should not be actionable if the en-
tirety of the ad is substantially accurate.179 Minor misstate-
ments should also not be actionable if no reasonable voter 
would change or base her vote on the false statement.180
In order for the false statements to be actionable, it must 
be possible to actually prove the statements were false.
 This 
would have the effect of narrowly tailoring the statute to pro-
hibit only materially false statements of material facts, and 
that have an actual impact on the candidate’s chance of being 
elected. Narrowing the statute to those false statements with a 
material effect on a campaign may be too hard a test for the 
courts to implement. It would be very difficult for a candidate 
to show harm, or even determine what harm is necessary in 
terms of polling numbers.  
181 
Therefore, a statute with the standard of objectively false 
statements would apply only to statements of fact, not opinions 
or ideas.182 In order to determine if something is a fact or an 
opinion, the courts should look to Ollman v. Evans.183
 
 178. Conn, supra note 
 The pro-
62, at 517–18. 
 179. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516–17 
(1991). 
 180. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 919–20 (arguing that candidates should 
not have to prove that they would have won the election had it not been for the 
false statement, but rather that a voter would have reasonably based her vote 
on the false statement of fact; for example, if the advertisement stated the 
candidate voted with the president 96% of the time, but in reality it was 94% 
the difference would not lead reasonable voters to change their minds, but if it 
was actually 38%, a voter may base her vote on the false statement). 
 181. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990) (finding 
that hyperbole statements are not included as statements of fact); see also Wil-
liam A. Williams, A Necessary Compromise: Protecting Electoral Integrity 
Through the Regulation of False Campaign Speech, 52 S.D. L. REV. 321, 338 
(2007) (suggesting that to be constitutional, a state law must apply only to 
statements that may be proven false by objective evidence, not including hy-
perboles, and place the burden on the plaintiff to prove the falsity and actual 
malice of the statements made by the defendant). 
 182. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) (“Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.”); see also Kruse, supra note 
113, at 169 (suggesting that to avoid being found overbroad, statutes need to 
proscribe only false statements of fact, not opinions). 
 183. 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying the plurality’s four-part 
test: (1) specificity of language; (2) verifiability; (3) linguistic context; and (4) 
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scribed statement should be objectively verifiable, because then 
it could be considered a proposed fact and not an opinion.184 It 
would be optimal to proscribe misleading statements; however, 
it would be constitutionally unfeasible to do so.185 The prohibit-
ing of false advertising objectively intended to mislead,186
3. Other Proposed Ways in Which to Narrowly Tailor a 
Statute 
 while 
noble, would be very difficult to prove. Prohibiting advertising 
intended to mislead voters would also raise additional ques-
tions, such as which standard of proof to use, which party has 
the burden of proving intent or lack of intent, and what evi-
dence would be allowed to show the intent.  
One proposed statute would include the language “intent to 
impede.”187 This language, however, would make the statute too 
narrow, and could lead the statutes to be classified as under-
inclusive. This would preclude the punishment of false state-
ments made by a candidate about himself, or false statements 
made about a candidate by an interest group supporting a can-
didate, both of which could cause harm. Another proposed solu-
tion would be to limit the application of the statute to just can-
didates or political parties.188 While it may be true that 
candidates and political parties do the most advertising and in-
dividuals are the most likely to have their speech chilled for 
fear of being sued,189
 
social context). See Kruse, supra note 
 this limitation would be under-inclusive. 
The limitation would not ban all false statements and would 
113, at 171–78, for a more in-depth 
analysis of how this analysis would work and what would or would not be con-
sidered false under this test.  
 184. Cf. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18–20 (“[It] would be destructive of the law 
of libel if a writer could escape liability for accusations of [defamatory conduct] 
simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words ‘I think.’” (alterations in 
original) (quoting Cianci v. New Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 
1980))).  
 185. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 917–18 (arguing that the state cannot 
hold someone accountable for a misleading statement made in good faith be-
cause of the enormous chilling effect it would have on political speech); see also 
Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207, 217–18 (Ala. 2001) 
(concluding that a statute covering true, but misleading, statements in politi-
cal advertisement was unconstitutional). 
 186. Goldman, supra note 3, at 918 (concluding that the intent requirement 
would decrease the threat of chilling good faith statements but still punish 
those clearly aimed at misleading the public). 
 187. Kruse, supra note 113, at 170. 
 188. Goldman, supra note 3, at 921–22. 
 189. Id. 
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not apply the law equally to all. In addition, by limiting the 
statute only to candidates or political parties, the statute could 
be easily evaded by individuals creating independent expendi-
tures, or through direct donations to independent expenditures 
which then could create false ads without fear of punishment. 
Another way to limit a statute is to have it apply only to 
published statements190 or broadcast, satellite, or cable adver-
tising.191 While a statute should be narrow, limiting it to just 
published statements or just television advertising narrows a 
statute too much and does not encompass the whole realm of 
false campaign speech. However, if a statute bars all false polit-
ical speech it would be too inclusive and would not provide 
enough breathing space, by possibly extending the repercus-
sions of the statute to statements made in the course of a live 
debate or a live interview. This could have a chilling effect on 
candidates and hinder their ability to partake in debating the 
issues for fear of stating something that may turn out to be 
false.192
Another proposed limitation would be to limit the 
timeframe of the statute to immediately preceding an elec-
tion.
 Limiting a statute to all paid political campaign adver-
tising or campaign material would allow candidates to partake 
in free debates and interviews without worry that any sponta-
neous misstatement would be punished. Although some forms 
of false statements would not be subject to punishment, such as 
internet blogs, these could be seen as less trustworthy by voters 
anyway and therefore less influential in the outcome of the 
election.  
193 While this could be helpful in narrowing the statute, it 
is unnecessary. Since most political advertising, if not all cam-
paign advertising, occurs within that time frame, it would not 
have a noticeable effect. It would allow for general criticism of 
the government and its members,194
 
 190. Kruse, supra note 
 but by restricting a statute 
to political campaign advertising, the ability to generally criti-
cize the government would already be protected. 
113, at 170. 
 191. Goldman, supra note 3, at 922–23. 
 192. See id. (excluding public debates and live interviews from a proposed 
television advertising limitation). 
 193. See id. at 923–24 (advocating for a 90 day window prior to an election 
for congressional members, a 120 day timeframe for presidential races, and a 
60 to 90 day time period for state and local elections). 
 194. Id. at 924. 
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The government has a compelling interest in protecting the 
integrity of the elections. Regardless of this compelling interest, 
any statute would need to be narrowly tailored to pass a strict 
scrutiny test. There are numerous different state statutes cur-
rently enacted and several proposals about how to create a con-
stitutional statute prohibiting false speech. A purely criminal 
statute or a statute that does not provide adequate remedies 
will not be effective; however a statute that would be more ef-
fective, such as a pure negligence standard, would not provide 
enough breathing space. 
III.  RECOMMENDED CAUSE OF ACTION   
Based on Court precedent, current state statutes, and the 
above-discussed proposals, the most likely outcome would be 
for the Court to find any attempt to regulate false, non-
defamatory statements of political speech unconstitutional. The 
Court made it clear in Alvarez that purely false speech is a pro-
tected category under the First Amendment.195 In order for the 
statute to meet strict scrutiny it likely needs to prevent a spe-
cific harm.196
The Court has already allowed defamatory actions against 
protected free speech using an actual malice standard.
 There are two possible ways to combat false cam-
paign speech. First, someone may bring a defamatory action. 
Secondly, a statute could regulate other campaign tactics and 
techniques, such as deception, to prevent the total erosion of 
election integrity. 
197
 
 195. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546–47 (2012) (plurali-
ty opinion) (“This opinion . . . rejects the notion that false speech should be in a 
general category that is presumptively unprotected.”). 
 By at 
least allowing for a defamatory action, there is a remedy for 
egregious violations and falsities. Including a defamatory re-
quirement in a statute, similar to the statute below, narrowly 
tailors the statute to speech that is harmful and already ac-
tionable. The following is a potential statute that incorporates 
an actual malice and defamatory standards: 
 196. See id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that most statutes that 
have survived strict scrutiny “narrow the statute to a subset of lies where spe-
cific harm is likely to occur”). 
 197. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) 
(“[C]onstitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public 
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his of-
ficial conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual mal-
ice’ . . . .”). 
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No person shall knowingly participate in the preparation or distribu-
tion of paid political campaign advertising or paid campaign material 
that is designed or tends to elect or defeat a candidate for nomination 
or election to public office, that includes objectively false and material 
statements of defamatory facts that the person knows to be false or 
communicates to others with reckless disregard of whether they are 
false. 
This proposed language, or something similar, would be an 
effective way to deter false statements of fact and to provide a 
remedy for those who were harmed by the statements. It in-
cludes the actual malice standard from Sullivan,198 as well as 
narrowly tailoring it to apply only to paid campaign advertising 
or material. By phrasing the actual malice standard as “that 
the person knows to be false or communicates to others with 
reckless disregard of whether they are false,” it creates breath-
ing space and could arguably be narrowly tailored and pass the 
test for strict scrutiny. States should also include findings or 
make a record of legislative history regarding the impact of 
false advertising to political turnout, voter confusion regarding 
false statements, and the threat to the integrity of their elec-
toral process.199
Even with this statute, it will still be hard to prove that the 
statements were objectively false and made with actual malice. 
A more effective statute would ban all misleading statements of 
fact or at least those with the intent to mislead,
 Legislative findings will help bolster the evi-
dence of a compelling state interest of protecting their election 
integrity. 
200 but that type 
of statute would not pass a breathing space analysis, and there-
fore would not withstand strict scrutiny. This statute would not 
be as effective as a flat-out ban on false political speech because 
it would require showing that the speech was defamatory. The 
Court would likely find any attempt to narrowly tailor a statute 
banning false, non-defamatory speech at odds with the First 
Amendment. Another concern of the Court’s in Alvarez was 
prosecutorial discretion that political prosecutors would have in 
bringing criminal action.201
 
 198. Id. at 270. 
 In order to combat this problem, a 
statute could create a civil cause of action, similar to libel or 
defamation. 
 199. See, e.g., Richman, supra note 1, at 667; White, supra note 2, at 1–3; 
Winsbro, supra note 2, at 853–54. 
 200. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 919–20. 
 201. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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States should regulate deceptive campaign practices. Even 
if constitutionally barred from banning false political speech, a 
state could pass a statute that regulates the dissemination of 
deceptive materials aimed at dissuading voters from voting or 
voting a particular way. The Court has recognized a state in-
terest in upholding election integrity.202
  CONCLUSION   
 Laws aimed at prevent-
ing false information about voter eligibility, polling places or 
election dates and times would help prevent voter deception 
and would be deemed constitutional. While critics could argue 
that any ban on speech is unconstitutional, this particular ban 
could pass strict scrutiny. The Court has already upheld consti-
tutional concerns regarding campaigning in the polling places, 
as well as other statutes banning some speech. Here, the court 
could find that the statute was narrowly tailored and the ban 
actually protected the compelling state interests. The harm, 
confused voters who are deceived into not voting, could be di-
rectly prevented by a statute that prevents knowingly false in-
formation. By providing for knowingly false or reckless disre-
gard, the state could protect breathing space but still stop 
deceptive campaign tactics. 
While the State has a compelling interest in protecting the 
integrity of its elections, it is highly unlikely that any law fo-
cusing strictly on the falsity of statements would be held consti-
tutional. Even a state statute regulating false speech or defam-
atory material statements of fact in campaign literature, 
material, or advertising calls into question the First Amend-
ment right to freedom of speech, especially free political speech. 
Despite the constitutional barriers present, this Note analyzes 
and proposes a different way to protect election integrity with-
out infringing on First Amendment rights. 
 
 
 202. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 204–06 (1992). 
